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Q. What are some important themes of 
globalization?
A. One of them is that global trade is increas-
ing. If you look at importing and exporting 
as  a  percentage  of  world  gross  domestic 
product,  it’s  grown  by  leaps  and  bounds 
over the past 20 or 30 years. That’s been true 
not only for the U.S. but also for just about 
everyone else. 
From the U.S. perspective, one of the 
most striking things is how much our trade 
with China has increased. A lot of that has 
come at the expense of trade with Korea and 
Japan, so it’s not just that we’re buying goods 
from China that we used to make at home.
The  other  thing  is  financial  markets. 
They’re  much  more  intertwined  than  they 
ever have been. Part of this is because gov-
ernments have allowed their residents to do 
more foreign investing and allowed foreign 
investors to buy more of their countries’ as-
sets. That’s a trend that started in the early 
1960s. For the U.S, Western Europe and Can-
ada, most of that liberalization was complet-
ed by the end of the 1970s. In Asia, it contin-
ued to happen in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The  trend  more  recently  hasn’t  been 
governments  relaxing  regulations  but  just 
the amount of innovation in financial mar-
kets and the willingness of people to invest 
in financial assets around the globe. 
Q. How does this globalization impact the 
current financial crisis?
A. In general, well-working financial markets 
perform better if they’re globalized. It’s bet-
ter to be able to spread risk across a number 
of countries. It’s better to be able to channel 
savings to their most productive uses any-
where in the world. If capital markets mess 
up,  if  they’re  misallocating  resources  or  if 
there’s something wrong with the financial 
system, it’s going to be magnified if financial 
markets are globalized.
Certainly, we’re very aware of the inter-
national aspects of this financial catastrophe. 
We can’t build a wall around American banks. 
For example, in the current crisis, there’s no 
way to “rescue” only U.S. banks. If we suc-
cessfully shore up the balance sheets of U.S. 
banks, this is good for the global banking 
system. This highlights why we need inter-
national cooperation. There’s a big incentive 
for each country to sit on the sidelines and 
let other countries take the risk and incur the 
expense of a financial rescue. We need some 
way to get all the major countries committed 
to a mutually agreed upon scheme to regu-
late international capital markets and ensure 
that they function smoothly in the future.
Q. What challenges does this financial crisis 
present for globalized financial markets?
A. It’s clear we needed more oversight of fi-
nancial markets. A general worry is that we’ll 
impose too much, that we’ll throw too much 
sand in the wheels. Part of that would be sti-
fling globalization. We don’t want to lose the 
benefits of a globalized financial system. 
A  separate  but  related  worry  is  that 
there’s going to be some kind of economic 
nationalism, with countries treating domestic 
and  foreign-owned  institutions  differently. 
I worry that without international coopera-
tion, each country will try to devise schemes 
that favor its own banks and citizens at the 
expense of foreign investors. For example, 
countries might provide deposit insurance— 
but  only  for  their  own  citizens.  We  could 
end up taking a giant step backward in the 
globalization of capital markets.
The thing we have to realize is that our 
financial system is intertwined with the rest 
of  the  world. The  failure  of  a  large  inter-
national  banking  concern  could  harm  our 
economy,  just  as  financial  troubles  in  the 
U.S. spill over into the rest of the world. We 
need to address this problem systematically, 
not in the ad hoc way we’re forced to dur-
ing a crisis.
Q. What are your current research interests?
A. There are two main threads to my research. 
One is trying to understand exchange rate 
movements—why they behave the way they 
do. My work in that area has involved think-
ing hard about the implications of exchange 
rates as asset prices, which spills over into 
the way asset prices in general behave.
Currency values don’t depend only on 
current  economic  fundamentals,  such  as 
trade balances, money supply and national 
income. The asset-price approach pays at-
tention not only to current data but also to 
expectations of what the fundamentals will 
be in the future. 
One of the key things that comes out of 
the work is the observation that asset prices, 
including exchange rates, are unpredictable 
under  much  more  general  circumstances 
than many economists have believed. Simply 
put, we can’t do a good job of forecasting 
changes in exchange rates. That has impli-
cations for policymakers. It has implications 
for Wall Street. It has implications for inter-
national business.
Q. So the time and effort investors and 
companies spend trying to forecast exchange 
rates is just a waste?
A. I do think there are times when currency 
prices get out of line, and we can forecast an 
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“It’s clear we needed more oversight of financial   
markets. A general worry is that we’ll impose too much,   
that we’ll throw too much sand in the wheels.” 
wasn’t such a great use of our resources. If 
we had more actively tried to prevent the ap-
preciation of the dollar, that shift in workers 
and  investment  away  from  manufacturing 
would have been slowed down.
Q. What contribution can the Dallas Fed’s 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 
make?
A. As you know, the institute is focused on 
how  monetary  policy  is  influenced  by  in-
ternational forces. A great thing about the 
Federal Reserve System is that it has 12 inde-
pendent research staffs that provide a port-
folio of research skills and policy insights. 
I agreed to join the Dallas Fed’s efforts on 
globalization because I think this subject is 
crucial, its importance is growing, and there 
wasn’t enough attention to these issues in 
the System.
Richard Fisher, the Dallas Fed’s presi-
dent, has talked a lot about trying to un-
derstand how openness feeds into domestic 
inflation. That’s an important question with 
obvious relevance to central bankers, but I 
think  there  are  other  important  questions 
that we should be thinking about. 
The exchange rate itself, should we wor-
ry about that? In thinking about unemploy-
ment, do we have to worry about the effects 
of foreign competition? Beyond those issues, 
the big thing we need to think about right 
now is the Fed’s other role—not in setting 
monetary policy but in keeping a well-func-
tioning financial system intact. There, I think 
the impact of globalization is enormous.
riod, when it went from the $20s to 
about $45 a barrel, the price didn’t 
go up at all in Europe. How is that 
possible? How could it be nearly 
doubling for us and not going up 
in Europe?
The answer is that the dollar 
was losing value against the euro 
at a rate equal to the price increase 
of oil. There’s no economic reason 
in the world that oil should have 
gotten more expensive for Ameri-
cans and not gotten more expensive for Eu-
ropeans. That’s purely a result of exchange 
rate misalignments. It leads to an inefficient 
allocation  of  resources.  There’s  no  reason 
Americans should have had to cut back on 
oil consumption more than Europeans.
It’s exactly because of situations like this 
that monetary policy ought to worry about 
exchange  rates.  Moreover,  the  exchange 
rate is something monetary policy can influ-
ence—the value of the dollar in terms of the 
euro, for example. 
The focus of monetary policy has been 
almost  completely  on  reducing  inflation, 
which  is  important.  A  credible  monetary 
policymaker has to keep inflation low, but 
another part of credible monetary policy is 
keeping the currency strong.
Q. Why should a strong dollar be a goal of 
monetary policy?
A. I wouldn’t say a strong dollar. 
I would say that a goal of mon-
etary  policy  is  to  prevent  large 
dollar  misalignments.  We  don’t 
want it too strong or too weak. 
Remember,  in  the  early  part  of 
this decade, the dollar was very 
strong,  and  our  manufacturing 
sector  was  getting  hammered. 
We had a hard time competing in 
world markets, even in sectors in 
which the U.S. is a world leader, 
like aircraft, sophisticated indus-
trial equipment and high tech. 
Our  economy  adapted—
resources  got  shifted  into  con-
struction  and  services—but  in 
retrospect maybe the reallocation 
eventual return to more sustainable levels. 
When the euro cost $1.60 earlier this year, I 
was pretty sure it would come down, just as 
I was pretty sure it would rise when it was 
down around 85 cents several years ago. 
But I am talking in these cases about a 
forecast over a long horizon. I sure wouldn’t 
want to try to predict which way exchange 
rates are going to go over the next couple of 
months or even the next couple of quarters.
Asset-price forecasters have a high pro-
pensity to fool themselves about how suc-
cessful their prediction schemes are. A lot of 
models might look good with hindsight. But 
there isn’t much rigorous, peer-reviewed evi-
dence that we can forecast exchange rates 
over short periods. 
Q. And the other thread in your research?
A.  I’ve  been  looking  at  aspects  of  open 
economies for monetary policy. The study 
of monetary policy is really dominated by 
this  closed-economy  framework,  which  is 
kind of crazy. What economy in the world is 
closed? Openness matters for monetary poli-
cy in a lot of different ways. To what extent, 
for example, should monetary policy worry 
about exchange rate misalignments? 
I like to use the example of the recent 
rise in the price of oil from below $20 a bar-
rel to up to $147. In the early part of that pe-